Books
Knowledge and Rational Action: Why What We Know Matters for the Rationality of What we Do.
(under contract with Routledge)
Papers
Synthese 203.6 (2024): 1-26
Abstract. That we may rely on our knowledge seems like a platitude. Yet, the view that knowledge is sufficient for permissible reliance faces a major challenge: when much hangs on whether we know, relying on our knowledge seems to license irrational action. Unfortunately, extant proposals to meet this challenge (Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008; Williamson, 2005a; Schulz, 2017, 2021b) either fail to make the correct predictions about high-stakes cases or, as I will argue, face a substantial objection. In this paper, I will offer two novel proposals for defending the sufficiency of knowledge for permissible reliance. My favoured proposal, which I call Flexible Fallibilism, is based on the idea that stakes can affect how we rely on our knowledge and how our knowledge determines what is rational for us to do. Besides making the correct predictions about high-stakes cases, I will argue that Flexible Fallibilism also provides us with a knowledge-based account of when to simplify our practical reasoning. Afterwards, I will present another proposal, which I call Dual Infallibilism, that combines two recent claims by Moss (2013, 2018) and Jackson (2019a) about credal knowledge and the metaphysics of doxastic states. While the offered proposals share various virtues, I will argue that we ultimately should prefer Flexible Fallibilism.
Knowledge and Acceptance
Asian Journal of Philosophy 2.1 (2023): 1-17
Abstract: In a recent paper, Jie Gao (Synthese 194:1901–17, 2017) has argued that there are acceptance-based counterexamples to the knowledge norm for practical reasoning (KPR). KPR tells us that we may only rely on known propositions in practical reasoning, yet there are cases of practical reasoning in which we seem to permissibly rely on merely accepted propositions, which fail to constitute knowledge. In this paper, I will argue that such cases pose no threat to a more broadly conceived knowledge-based view of practical reasoning. I will first motivate the view that rational acceptance depends on a knowledge-based condition being met. I will then show how KPR can be amended—yielding what I call KPR+—to include this condition. I will argue that KPR+ not only avoids Gao’s counterexample, but harbours additional explanatory power by providing an account of the normative role of acceptance in practical reasoning. Finally, I will defend KPR+ against objections by employing theoretical tools that are readily available to those sympathetic to knowledge-based views.
Finding Excuses for J=K
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11.1 (2022): 32-40.
Abstract: According to J=K, only beliefs that qualify as knowledge are epistemically justified. Traditionalists about justification have objected to this view that it predicts that radically deceived subjects do not have justified beliefs, which they take to be counter-intuitive. In response, proponents of J=K have argued that traditionalists mistake being justified with being excused in the relevant cases. To make this response work, Timothy Williamson has offered a dispositional account of excuse which has recently been challenged by Jessica Brown. She has presented cases in which Williamson’s account excuses subjects believing things in an epistemically reckless fashion. To steer clear of Brown’s counterexamples, I argue for a modification of Williamson’s account that employs a more fine-grained notion of the dispositions involved.
Knowledge and Decision
Synthese 200.2 (2022): 1-13 (with J. Koscholke, M. Schulz, P. Rich)
Corona und testimoniale Skepsis
in Wissensproduktion und Wissenstransfer in Zeiten der Pandemie, Hauswald, Rico and Schmechtig, Pedro (eds.), Verlag Karl Alber. 2022. (with M. Schulz)
Edited Topical Collections
Knowledge and decision
collection for Synthese (co-edited with J. Koscholke, P. Rich, M. Schulz)
Work in progress/under review
- A paper in which I argue that belief-first reductionism is false and that the relation between credences and probability beliefs is rather governed by a norm of epistemic rationality. (under review)
- A paper in which I explore drawing an analogy to the legal domain to elucidate the notion of epistemic justification and excuse. (under review)
- A paper in which I explore the claim that epistemic justification not just concerns the individual believer, but also third parties. (under review)
- A paper in which I argue that we sanction non-punitively in the epistemic domain, showing that popular relationship modification accounts of epistemic blame are false. (in preparation)
- A paper in which I discuss why we are more inclined to excuse beliefs due to asthenic affects (fear, anxiety or fright) than due to sthenic affects (such as anger, wrath or zeal) (in preparation)