Roman Heil

Books

Knowledge and Rational Action. Why What We Know Matters for the Rationality of What We Do. Routledge (2025) [Link]

Papers

(Forthcoming) Epistemic Justification and Third Parties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: 1-34.


(Forthcoming) Précis zu Knowledge and Rational Action & Replik zu den Kommentaren von Alexander Dinges und Nadja El Kassar. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung: 1-10.

(2026) A Match Made in Rational Heaven? How Credences Relate to Probability Beliefs. Theoria. 1-10. [Link]

(2026) Sind moralische Helden epistemisch irrational? Ein Kommentar zu Moral Conviction and Moral Uncertainty. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung: 1-8. [Link]


(2025) Trust Reductions, Epistemic Blame and Preventative Measures. Episteme: 1-20. [Link]

(2024) How to Act on What You Know Synthese 203.6: 1-26 [Link]


(2023) Knowledge and Acceptance. Asian Journal of Philosophy 2.1: 1-17 [Link]

(2022) Finding Excuses for J=K. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11.1: 32-40. [Link]

(2022) Knowledge and Decision. Synthese 200.2: 1-13 (with J. Koscholke, M. Schulz, P. Rich) [Link]

(2022) Corona und testimoniale Skepsis in Wissensproduktion und Wissenstransfer in Zeiten der Pandemie, Hauswald, Rico and Schmechtig, Pedro (eds.), Verlag Karl Alber. (with M. Schulz)

Edited Topical Collections

Knowledge and decision
collection for Synthese (co-edited with J. Koscholke, P. Rich, M. Schulz)

Work in production/under review/in preparation

  • A paper in which a co-author and I argue that there are factice mental states that iterate. (under review)
  • A paper in which I argue that a particularly promising solution to the voluntarism puzzle motivates the view that there are interpersonal doxastic obligations (minor revisions).
  • A paper in which I explore drawing an analogy to the legal domain to elucidate the notion of epistemic justification and excuse. (in preparation)
  • A paper in which I explore how collective epistemic instrumentalist can and should handle concerns about clutter avoidance. (in preparation)
  • A paper in which I discuss why we are more inclined to excuse beliefs due to asthenic affects (fear, anxiety or fright) than due to sthenic affects (such as anger, wrath or zeal). (in preparation)